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Introduction  
Security analysts have struggled over the preceding years to come to terms with the challenges 
of the current era. They have offered a range of visions on the shape of future warfare, some 
focusing on the roots of conflicts and others on the types of warfare that will be waged. U.S. 
defense officials, seeing a chaotic and unpredictable world, went so far as to move away from 
threat-based planning toward a “capabilities-based” approach,[2] focusing on the proverbial 
hammers, rather than the specific types of nails. None of these approaches has taken a step 
back to search for fundamental changes in the broader socio-political nature of our current era, to 
estimate how these changes will affect both coming conflicts and our ability to respond to those 
conflicts, and to build strategies pragmatically tailored to the nature and limitations of the age.  
The dominant characteristic of the current era, which will define both the tenor of conflict around 
the world and our ability to react to it, is the declining state power of the world’s most developed 
nation-states. Even as instability in the developing world increases in the coming years, the 
means available to America and her allies for dealing with the chaotic international environment 
of the twenty-first century will be increasingly constrained. The most developed nation-states are 
not in danger of being overtaken, but their ability to deal with adversaries ranging from rising 
regional powers to non-state actors will be limited compared to that at the heights of the nation-
state period. As a result, warfare will be limited, but prevalent; centered in the peripheral fields of 
the developing world, where political unrest and economic penetration will be spark and fuel for 
regional power struggles and resultant conflict. Planning and preparation for warfare over the 
coming century must begin with a broader assessment of the characteristics of our current era 
and their effect on states and states’ ability to wage warfare. From this basis, the nature of 
potential threats and the appropriate strategies states should follow to deal with them become 
much clearer.  
The current era did not begin with the collapse of the twin towers on 9/11 or even the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. Rather, it came in quietly, a product of evolution more than revolution, sometime after 
the Allied triumph of 1945 that ended an unlimited war of annihilation. For at least the past 
quarter-century, the state power of the most developed nation-states has been on the wane, 
ushering in a period of limited warfare that has yet to be fully grasped by strategic planners and 
politicians across the world. The argument is two-fold.  First, state power, that portion of national 
power that can be mobilized and controlled by the state government to serve its ends, is declining 
as state governments’ extractive power and capacity for independent action wanes in this late 
nation-state period. This decline is uneven and is likely to be most pronounced in the most 
developed nation-states. Second, due to this waning state power and the strongly-held illusion 
that governments have access to a greater portion of national power than is truly the case, policy-
makers must realistically assess capabilities and set strategies and policies appropriate to this 
limited power.  This means a turn away from the annihilatory military strategies of the nationalist 
period and a return to the more circumscribed strategies of attrition that were used prior to its rise. 
These conditions have been with us since sometime around the middle of the twentieth century, 
but their prominence has grown significantly since the end of the Cold War.  
The effects of this era are unevenly distributed, but the new constraints will be felt most acutely in 
the leading nation-states, where governments have become accustomed to high levels of state 
power. These developed states will find themselves increasingly constrained even as they must 
deal with the conflicts that will shape the future of the developing world, as ethnic splinters and 
former colonial states attempt to sort out a stable political order over the coming decades. These 
states, many of which are pursuing aggressive nationalism in order to become nation-states 
themselves, will continue to be the world’s trouble spots. The world’s nation-state powers will be 
forced to find new strategies, appropriate to the limitations of the era, in order to deal with these 
trouble spots.  
For practitioners of warfare, this period brings uncomfortable, but not unprecedented challenges. 
The waning power of the nation-state government and the growing independence of people from 
government have produced an era dominated by limited forms of warfare for the first time since 
the rise of nationalism. Warfare is limited in the sense that states will generally be unable to 
pursue the complete prostration of their enemies, as was the case in many of the epic wars of the 
last two centuries. More circumscribed ways, ends, and means will characterize wars of this 
period, although individual actions may be every bit as bloody and chaotic as any battle in history. 
Our adversaries recognize the nature of this era, and have turned to limited and asymmetric 
strategies, forcing America and her allies out of their comfort zone. The buzzwords of the day—
insurgency, asymmetry, netwar, and fourth-generation war—are simply attempts to quantify a 
return to limited forms of warfare. Such wars call for a strategy of attrition, a much different type of 
strategy than the all-out war of annihilation that has become America’s preferred mode of battle.  
War of annihilation seeks the complete prostration of the enemy in unconditional surrender. War 
of attrition is a more circumscribed form that uses various tools, from battle, to maneuver, to other 
elements of national power, to exhaust the enemy in to acquiescence. Less clear-cut and rapid, 
this form has often been necessary in history when state power has been limited or adversaries 
have refused to come into open annihilatory battle. This form of war is difficult to embrace, 
especially for America, where both the public and the national security community are 
predisposed to rapid and decisive victories, massing technological and economic advantages 
against enemy weaknesses to bring a clear-cut resolution to conflict.[3] Americans desire their 
conflicts to be “a championship boxing match, fought in plain view at high noon and settled by a 
knockout punch.” Unfortunately, the reality of warfare in many ages has often been more like “a 
thousand separate wrestling matches, fought in the dark and won by tripping the opponent.”[4]  
American defense officials must come to terms, first, with the nature of this era and the 
constraints that it will place on warfare. In the first and second sections below, the effects of 
previous ages on warfare will be laid out and the characteristics of the current age will be defined. 
Stemming from this analysis, defense planners must prepare themselves to confront the likely 
threats of the coming century with strategies suited to the conditions at hand. In the third section, 
I will discuss the looming threats and likely sources of conflict over the next 50 to 100 years and 
will broadly sketch how the American military establishment must be prepared to pursue policy 
ends through uncomfortable strategies of attrition. Critical adjustments must be made in the 
defense establishment in order to be prepared for the challenges presented by such strategies.  
This period is one of evolution, not revolution. The nation-state is not dead, but the power of 
nation-state governments is on the decline. Social and technological developments bring new 
challenges to the battlefield and empower sub-state groups from gangs to insurgent cells, but 
they have not revolutionarily changed the nature of war. The fundamental challenge at hand is to 
recognize the characteristics and limitations of the current era as they affect not only our potential 
adversaries, but also our own capacity to act. By using strategies unsuited to the nature of this 
era, we attempt to fight a style of war from a bygone era at the peril of defeat in this one. 
Something New Under the Sun?  
In the decade since the end of the Cold War, scholars have offered theses on the end of history, 
the clash of civilizations, the arc of instability, the rise and fall of empires, suppositions about the 
emergence of the market-state, and the typologies of fourth- and even fifth-generation warfare.[5] 
Each offers thoughts on how new, even revolutionary phenomena will change international 
relations and warfare in unprecedented ways. Each holds some elements of truth. Some focus on 
the new strategies, tactics, and organizational structures that will be used by state and non-state 
actors, while others examine various aspects of the international system to explain the crux of 
conflict in the coming century. Each predicts that a revolutionary development in politics, ideology, 
technology, or social organization has created a bold new era. None attempts to place this new 
era within the context of the ebb and flow of warfare, which has varied throughout history with the 
strength of its socio-political base, nor to develop that idea with regard to the potential sources of 
conflict over the remainder of the century. A broader, perhaps less elegant view is required.  
Our difficulty in dealing with current challenges owes at least as much to our lack of recognition of 
our own strengths and limitations in this era as it does to any radical new technologies or 
strategies on the part of our adversaries. Indeed, some argue that there is “nothing new under the 
sun” and that these groups are simply fighting small wars with modern weapons in ways that 
would have been wholly familiar to Napoleon and even Alexander.[6] If we truly face nothing new 
under the sun, then why are rogue bands of extremists, criminals, tribesmen, and nationalist 
insurgents presenting such problems to states combating them around the globe today? Why is 
political unrest and violence bubbling up in states throughout the developing world? Why do 
conservative pundits bemoan the lack of support, stamina, and mobilization of the American 
public behind this Global War? Why are generals and military analysts mulling over whether or 
not an extended deployment of 160,000 U.S. troops can be sustained without “breaking” the 
military of the most powerful nation in the world? The answer is that nothing has changed in the 
nature of warfare, but the both particular characteristics of many states and spirit of the age have 
begun to shift. This shift must be recognized and accounted for in order to adopt strategies 
appropriate to the time.  
The amazing social and technological changes that have confronted this world over the past 
years seem to be constantly accelerating, provoking predictions of radical change in the nature of 
politics and warfare. Yet, some of the grizzled, skeptical, and often conservative-minded senior 
practitioners of land warfare are not quick to buy off on new merchandise. Having studied 
millennia of war, many are more comfortable with continuities than with radical departures. Most 
of these skeptics, however, are comfortable with the familiar terms of an old soldier who was able 
to define change in warfare through a simple concept, providing continuity through the ages.  
While some commentators argue that unprecedented new generations of war are in the offing, or 
that we have reached a “post-Clausewitzian” era, Clausewitz would readily recognize that the 
changes afoot stem from shifts that are taking place in his “trinity” of war. The trinity that makes 
up war is composed of the blind natural force of the people, the creative realm of the commander, 
and the rational subordination of these factors to reason as an instrument of policy by a 
government or, in our age especially, other political leadership.[7]  
Clausewitz noted that as the social, political, cultural, technological, and economic contexts of the 
era changed, the balance between the three elements of the trinity has shifted with dramatic 
results on the conduct of warfare. This is no trifling matter, for soldiers and statesmen who have 
tried to pursue strategies without regard to changes in this trinity of warfare have generally met 
resounding failure. Clausewitz warned that “the aims that a belligerent adopts, and the resources 
he employs, must be governed by the particular characteristics of his own position; but they will 
also conform to the spirit of the age and to its general character.”[8]  
So what is the spirit of this age and its general character? What is the status of Clausewitz’s 
trinity? Nation-state governments are waning in capacity and control even as the populace is 
growing in power and independence. Thus, while the blind natural force of the masses is as 
powerful as ever, state governments are less able to harness and subordinate it as an instrument 
of policy. In the most developed nation-states, this means that governments and militaries cannot 
expect the massive mobilizations of personnel and economic might, the nationalistic fervor, or the 
unflinching popular support they received in the past. They will be waging wars with limited 
means, requiring a limitation of ways and ends. A review of numerous trends in state power will 
show that governments’ abilities to extract resources and put them to their use are on the decline.  
While governments are weaker, the “blind natural force” of the populace holds more power than 
ever before. This power comes in the form of commercially available military weapons and 
equipment, ubiquitous advanced communications and transportation, and technological 
knowledge that facilitates asymmetric informational and kinetic attacks. This popular power acts 
differently with regard to the Clausewitzian trinity than it has in the past. While the state is 
undoubtedly still the major actor on the scene, it will be argued that for the first time since the rise 
of the nation-state, the element of blind natural force of the populace at the state level is, to a 
degree, becoming disconnected from the rational subordination of the government and the 
creative spirit of the military commander. In the fragile states of the developing world, the 
weakening of governments and the rising power of the populace presents the threat of intrastate 
war, fought between trinitarian adversaries[9] at the state and sub-state level. These sub-state 
combatants, possessing the full complement of Clausewitz’s trinity, are not peer competitors with 
the state, but their ability to bedevil states’ plans is already clear.  
These observations are based on Clausewitz’s nearly two-hundred year old concept, which was 
in turn based on his study of warfare back to antiquity. Clausewitz is not alone in looking to the 
balance between state and society to understand the power that stands behind war-making ability. 
Neoclassical realists, recognizing that state governments cannot always extract and freely utilize 
societal resources to their ends, have also focused on the relationship between the state and the 
society to determine how much power is actually at the disposal of state governments. In this 
discussion of warfare, state power can be narrowly defined as the ability of the state as a 
governmental institution to make and implement foreign policy (to include military operations), 
based on its capacity to extract and mobilize resources from domestic society and its capacity for 
action independent of domestic constraints.[10] Stated differently, state power is “that portion of 
national power that the government can extract for its purposes and reflects the ease with which 
central decisionmakers can achieve their ends.”[11] Raw power calculations are insufficient for 
determining the true power balance because state leaders cannot always extract and mobilize 
resources and pursue policies freely, constricting their ability to use the full range of national 
power.[12] This is why Clausewitz looked not only to the government and the military, instruments 
of the state, but also to the society in order to determine the foundation of war-making might.  
It is imperative that strategic planners take a serious accounting of the Clausewitzian trinity, the 
relationship between state and society, and the resultant state power available for use today. 
Much of current strategic thinking and planning is based firmly on the hard won experiences of 
international diplomacy and conflict at the height nation-state era, but the nation-state of today is 
not the same as that of 1938 or 1945. If the past is any indication, the disconnect between 
government and the populace and decreasing state power should portend an era of limited war. 
However, the empowerment of individual citizens, corporations, and other sub-state forces also 
suggests that this era of limited war will be characterized by the spread of violence at the sub-
state level. Indeed, the majority of wars and organized political violence since the end of World 
War II have fit this pattern.[13] What is significant is that this analysis attributes this period of 
limited warfare and increasing sub-state violence to permanent changes in the nature of the 
nation-state, rather than to a temporary condition such as the bipolar system of the Cold War, the 
current unipolar system, nuclear weapons, or post-Cold War upheaval.  
Prior to the first major expressions of nationalism at the end of the eighteenth century, warfare 
had been rather limited. Although states were growing in consolidation and capability, the 
citizenry remained separated from warfare. Standing armies were first developed as mercenary 
forces, then through recruitment from willing, often underprivileged sectors of the population. 
Foreign policy and warfare remained largely an affair between monarchs, with relatively little 
involvement of the blind natural force of the populace. The constraints in the means available to 
governments and commanders kept the ends sought circumscribed and warfare remained limited 
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[15] It was quite a shock, then, when the 
monarchs of Europe tasted the blind natural force of the people as the French Revolution 
unleashed a new era of warfare.  
On August 23, 1793, the levee en masse brought the force of France’s population into the fray, 
putting over three-quarters of a million men under arms. The mercenary armies of Europe stood 
no chance against such a force. Beyond the increase in numbers, the “democratization of the 
army” in revolutionary France united the force behind the idea of defending their country, 
prompting men to endure greater hardships, fight more determinedly, and venture farther from 
their bases. At first, the other powers of Europe rejected the new French ways of war, but they 
were soon forced to follow suit in the face of French successes.[16]  
The rise of the mass army connotes more than simple jump in troop numbers. For a military to 
truly be a mass army, it must be able to maintain its size and combat power despite the 
challenges of prolonged combat. In the modern era, this requires an educated and indoctrinated 
citizenry and a society mobilized at the hand of the government to provide material support and 
manpower reinforcements to offset rapid combat losses. Mass mobilization and increased 
dispersion on the battlefield in the face of deadlier weapons demanded that states cultivate 
nationalism as an ideology that motivated and bound society behind the policy aims of the 
government. States introduced standard, compulsory education that produced literate citizens 
and inculcated a common linguistic, high cultural, and historical outlook that cemented a national 
identity and a loyalty to the nation-state. In turn, nationalism placed the power of the people 
squarely behind the state’s policies, increasing the intensity of warfare,[17] until “the sole aim of 
war was to overthrow the opponent. Not until he was prostrate was it considered possible to 
pause and try to reconcile the opposing interests.” Clausewitz observed that when the third 
element of the trinity was unleashed, “war, untrammeled by any conventional restraints, had 
broken loose in all its elemental fury. This was due to the peoples’ new share in these great 
affairs of the state.”[18]  
Successful military and political leaders adjusted their strategies in accordance with the 
contraction and expansion of warfare through these ages. Following on Clausewitz’s assessment 
of the limited and unlimited forms of wars, German military historian Hans Delbruck distinguished 
between strategies of annihilation and attrition. As war tended toward the extreme, states 
pursued strategies of annihilation. In annihilatory wars, victory is sought through the complete 
prostration of the enemy. The commander seeks battle above all else and pursues the enemy 
until he is completely incapable of further resistance.[19] When the forces and capabilities at the 
commander’s disposal are great and the ends desired are major, war of annihilation is the 
obvious choice. This, in the American experience, is how wars are won.  
Yet sometimes it is impossible to win wars in this way. Through history, due to limited means or 
uncooperative opponents, commanders have also found themselves forced to follow strategies of 
attrition. Attrition strategy, translated from the German Ermattungsstrategie, does not connote 
simple-mindedly amassing body count to bleed the enemy into submission. Rather, in contrast to 
annihilation, it connotes a strategy to exhaust the enemy’s will to continue when it becomes 
impossible or undesirable to completely prostrate an enemy. The ends pursued in a war of 
attrition must be more circumscribed, and commanders must choose between a range of tools, 
seeking over time to exhaust the enemy’s will to resist, whereby he will accept the terms of 
peace.[20] As much as soldiers may want to wage war of annihilation, it is impossible to 
annihilate the enemy if the forces or will are lacking, or if the enemy cannot be fixed and 
dispatched of wholesale. For this reason, Delbruck labels attrition warfare as “one of the most 
complicated but most frequent phenomena in world history.”[21]  
These issues will be returned to, but the contrast between these two styles of warfare has 
accompanied the contraction and expansion of warfare since antiquity. Since the Napoleonic 
wars, the strategy of annihilation has been ascendant as the base of warfare swelled with the 
mobilized fury of the nation-state. Military professionals, political leaders, and even the public 
expect victory to come quickly, on annihilatory terms. There is no reason to expect otherwise, 
unless the centuries-old trend of expansion in warfare (one trend in a series of ups and downs) 
has passed its peak.  
Well before the World Wars of the twentieth century, Clausewitz asked, “Will this [unlimited war] 
always be the case in the future? From now on will every war in Europe be waged with the full 
resources of the state, and therefore have to be fought only over major issues that affect the 
people? Or shall we again see a gradual separation taking place between government and 
people?”[22]  
While the scope of war continued to expand for more than a century after his death, culminating 
in the two cataclysmic World Wars of the twentieth century, we are once again swinging back 
toward a more limited form of war due to a gradual separation between government and people. 
Specifically, the decline in state power and the growing independence of populations from their 
governments has had two results. First, interstate war is increasingly limited in scope and aims, 
due to a narrowing of the nation-state’s power and the growing disconnect from the blind natural 
fury of the population. Second, intrastate war is increasingly violent and protracted due to the 
relative rise in power of the people and their sub-state political-military leaders. In both cases, 
however, the limited form of the strategy of attrition is ascendant.  
Many look at technology, such as the stark threat of nuclear Armageddon, or international 
structure, such as the bipolar arrangement of the Cold War, to explain the shape of warfare over 
the last sixty years. These issues surely loomed large over warfare, but they do not explain why 
virulent intrastate wars and limited interstate wars have continued to be a fixture even after the 
demise of the Soviet Union. Clausewitz suggests we look elsewhere for our answer: “Very few of 
the new manifestations in war can be ascribed to new inventions or new departures in ideas. 
They result mainly from the transformation of society and new social conditions.”[23] Let us look, 
then, at what has changed in society and its conditions, how that has affected the state, and how 
that in turn affects warfare. 
The Decline of State Power 
If a state government aims to pursue rational ends autonomously (Clausewitz’s role for the 
government in the trinity) it must be able to extract resources from the territory and the population 
and to turn those resources (means) to its ends through strategy. If the extractive capacity of the 
nation-state is in decline, then its state power must be as well. Government power to extract 
resources is indeed waning, especially amongst the most developed democratic states. Active 
cultivation of nationalism and the concomitant societal support of the nation-state government are 
on the downturn. Armies are shrinking and increasingly dependent on private contractor support. 
Meanwhile society is gaining power and independence through economic development, changing 
perceptions of government, and the empowerment engendered by technological advances. 
These phenomena are robbing states of their capacity to act boldly in the international arena, yet 
the illusion of residual state power provides leaders with dangerous yearnings that may lead to 
overstretch. 
National power consists of those elements that, in sum, constitute the reservoir of power 
potentially available to the nation for use domestically or internationally. This is the reservoir from 
which the state government can draw, based on its extractive capacity. While there is no 
definitive list of the elements of national power, Morgenthau listed geography, natural resources, 
industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, quality 
of diplomacy, and quality of government. A review of these elements of national power will show 
that even where national power has expanded the state’s capacity to extract and mobilize that 
power has waned, leaving the government with limited means and a circumscribed base for 
foreign policy and war.  
Starting with the more concrete elements of national power (geography, natural resources, and 
industrial capacity) it would seem that these aspects are relatively constant contributors to 
national and even state power. Most nation-states today have approximately the same geography 
and resource endowment as they did a half-century ago, and often greater industrial capacity. Yet, 
numerous factors have weakened states’ grasp on these elements. For example, although 
Morgenthau acknowledged that geography is one of the most enduring sources of national power, 
he admitted that geography declined in importance from the beginning of the 1800s until the 
middle of the twentieth century due to the effects of advances in communications and 
transportation.[24] This trend has only accelerated since he wrote. A new combination of social 
networking, advanced communications technology, and increasing ease of travel allowed a non-
state network of terrorists to shatter America’s feeling of comfortable geographic isolation on 9/11. 
Technology has not and will not erase the factors on the ground that have influenced international 
relations for thousands of years, but the increasing ease by which people and ideas move has 
robbed fortress-nations of some degree of their power.  
Like geography, natural resources would seem to be a fairly constant factor. Some states are 
graced with territories that are resource-rich, while others are not. A number of things have 
changed, however. Burgeoning populations and booming economies have greatly increased 
resource requirements, making resource self-sufficiency a thing of the past. Furthermore, 
resources are tied up in commercial contracts and traded around the world, reducing many state 
governments’ unfettered access to their resources, especially in anything less than an emergency 
of major proportions.  
Not only must a state possess raw materials, but it must also have the requisite industrial 
capabilities to turn these raw materials into infrastructure, goods, and weapons in order to create 
and project power. During the days of the World Wars, the Great Powers had a lock on 
production from the extraction of raw materials (at home or in colonized or conquered territories) 
to the manufacture of the finished product. Today, the globalized market economy has sought 
efficiencies by seeking the most cost efficient venues for extracting resources and various levels 
of manufacturing. For example, basic, labor intensive manufacturing is carried out in the 
developing world where labor is cheap, while more advanced processes are done where workers 
have the requisite training and skills. Resultantly, the industrial capacity of the world has 
increased greatly, but in many ways, nation-states are less prepared for mass wartime 
mobilization than they were in 1938. Owing to the global market economy and the increasing 
complexity of manufactured goods, relatively few products are transformed from raw material into 
retail good in one country today. States no longer have an iron grip on production from cradle to 
grave, while multi-national corporations increasingly do.  
The world population has soared since the World Wars, but current demographic trends in many 
of the most developed nations threaten to rob states of manpower and revenue. Birth rates have 
fallen and life expectancy has risen in the developed world to the extent that many states are 
facing the problems of aging populations. This trend reduces national economic productivity even 
as it shoulders state and society with higher costs of caring for its elderly. It also reduces the 
manpower and economic resources available to the state for warfare. This trend is predicted to hit 
European powers, Japan, and China hardest, but the United States is also facing an aging 
population. The huge costs of aging populations are likely to encroach significantly on military 
spending in the world’s major powers. While this trend may reduce the likelihood of great power 
war, it will limit the ability of these powers to maintain a robust international presence, thereby 
removing a significant check on conflict in the developing world.[25]  
Beyond these physical characteristics, other elements of national power rest on the relationship 
between the government and the populace. Military preparedness, national morale, national 
character, quality of government, and quality of diplomacy all require that the citizens stand 
behind governments’ policies and that the government has a relatively free hand to extract 
support and to act. States have lost ground recently in each of these categories of power as the 
populace has grown more powerful and less willing to cede power to the government. 
Significantly, the transfer of many roles from the public to the private sector has robbed 
governments of capacity and legitimacy. These trends have contributed to a growing disconnect 
between governments and the populace.  
The most significant factor in uniting populations behind nation-state governments has been 
nationalism. Nationalism, a major factor in states’ extractive power and the historical driver behind 
mass armies and annihilatory warfare, has declined significantly in most of the world’s leading 
powers. States that once pursued nationalism as a means for producing mass armies have 
largely left these formations behind, opting instead for smaller, more technologically developed 
militaries. Over the course of the twentieth century, European states blanketed by a nuclear 
umbrella could forgo the nationalistic indoctrination that preparedness for mass mobilization 
would have otherwise required. Blatantly nationalistic historians, in vogue prior to the World Wars, 
generally disappeared from the mainstream after World War II. A number of influences, from the 
repugnance of Hitler’s blend of nationalism and racism to the rise of non-European nations as 
powers during World War II, combined to debunk unbridled nationalistic ideology and national or 
ethnic superiority in the histories written in the West.[26]  
A number of phenomena have shaken public trust in government. The proliferation of unfettered 
and ever-more instant media coverage of government scandals and fiascos, along with the often 
bumbling performance of many governments in crises throughout the latter part of the twentieth 
century surely contributed to a growing sense of distrust amongst populations of even the most 
advanced democracies. Throughout the advanced democratic states in North America, Europe, 
and Japan, there is evidence of mounting dissatisfaction with government. This trend has been 
“longest and clearest” in the United States over the past 25 years. In one important indicator of 
dissatisfaction, only 29 percent of American respondents in 1964 agreed that “the government is 
pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves.” By 1998 that percentage had 
increased to 63 percent. Similar evidence has been documented for the democracies of Europe 
and Japan.[27] Populations that do not trust their government cannot be mobilized to the extent 
that they were at the peak of trust in the nation-state. Significantly, this can be seen in the 
resistance to taxation in a number of developed nation-states, not least of which is the United 
States.[28]  
Driven itself by the decline of resources available to governments and the growing demands of 
the population, privatization is a major phenomenon in the waning of state power. Financially-
constrained governments have been forced to look for more efficient ways of providing services 
to their populations. Unable to keep pace with growth in a number of areas, governments have 
turned to private sector companies to build and manage roads, administer prisons, provide 
domestic security, and even perform many military functions. While finding the most efficient 
practices makes economic sense, privatization robs government of the chance to prove its worth 
to the citizens by providing quality services and infrastructure. At the same time, the transfer of 
many tasks to the private sector saps state capacity for independent action. This phenomenon is 
especially striking in the security sector.  
The state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force has long been the sine qua non of its capacity 
to rule over its territory. That monopoly of force has recently begun to degrade for the first time 
since the rise of the nation-state. Private citizens now hold more military weapons than do 
governments and both governments and individuals are turning to private security contractors for 
internal and external policing and formerly-military tasks.[29] In the United States, private security 
forces draw more spending and have more manpower and weapons than governmental police 
forces. Britain, likewise has more private than public security forces. This is more than a simple 
shift of security roles to a more efficient private sector force. It is accompanied by “diminishing 
confidence in the ability of government security forces to manage the dangers properly.”[30]  
Military preparedness of nation-states, a major element of national power, has also been 
impacted by privatization. Within states, the transfer of infrastructure and critical functions to the 
private sector complicates security planning. Many high-value targets and critical vulnerabilities 
are no longer government facilities, but rather are owned and operated by the private sector,[31] 
making planning, implementation, and oversight of security measures more complicated. More to 
the point, military functions themselves have been privatized by governments throughout the 
world.  
Due to recent events in Iraq, it is now well-known that private contractors are relied upon to carry 
out many tasks once performed by military personnel. In Iraq, over 180,000 civilians of various 
nationalities are employed under U.S. government contracts. As many as 30,000 of these are 
private security contractors, most of whom are contracted by the Department of Defense.[32] 
Contractors do everything from logistics support and food services to convoy security. Militaries 
under increasing financial pressure, especially with the post-Cold War draw-downs, found that by 
outsourcing more mundane tasks to contractors they could continue to afford the showcase 
weapons and programs they had grown to love. This trend expanded over the last decade, to the 
point that the U.S. military, at its current size and force structure, could not carry out the mission 
in Iraq without contractor support.[33] Many states have become reliant on high levels of 
contractor support to carry out their military operations.[34]  
The expansion of private military companies is part and parcel of the new era of warfare. As the 
government wanes in power and loses a degree of support in the base of its population, it 
becomes difficult to mobilize citizen soldiers. Instead of calling for more volunteers or instituting 
conscription, governments find it much easier to turn to the market, finding a surplus of former 
military members, many of whom were cashiered in the post-Cold War draw-downs.[35] 
Contractors provide states with a ready pool of military capacity, allowing government soldiers to 
be focused on the highest priority tasks. They also allow states to flesh out their ranks without 
having to mobilize or risk disenfranchising the population. There are serious drawbacks to 
privatization, however, that may add to the woes of the nation-state as an institution.  
Even as private security companies grow in size, many states are finding it difficult to man their 
military forces. Many states downsized their military forces, anticipating a “peace dividend” at the 
end of the Cold War. Even after 9/11, the percentage of the U.S. population employed in the 
active duty military remains at a low not seen since before Pearl Harbor.[36] Furthermore, states 
are drawing their forces “predominantly from certain—often disadvantaged—social groups.”[37] 
These trends have both weakened state power and narrowed the base of popular support and 
involvement on which warfare rests. Furthermore, as states lean more on their reserve forces to 
flesh out their armies, they are forced to demand greater dislocation on the part of citizen soldiers, 
their families, and their employers,[38] further reducing the state’s independent capacity for action.  
In sum, these phenomena have yielded and era of significantly reduced state power. More 
specifically, while the array of military hardware at the hands of today’s governments is fearsome, 
this military machine is backed by a greatly constricted popular base. In 2001, P.W. Singer, an 
expert on military privatization, observed, “Not since the eighteenth century has there been such 
reliance on private soldiers to accomplish tasks directly affecting the tactical and strategic 
success of military engagement.”[39] This transition from the mass armies of the nationalistic 
period back toward the small, professional armies like those of the ancien regime must be 
accompanied by a similar transition in grand strategy.  
Conflict in Our Era: Its Roots and the Strategic Requirement 
Warfare in our time will change apace with political and social trends, just as it has since the 
dawn of political violence. The constricting base of state power and the swing away from 
unlimited mass warfare is not unprecedented, but the combination of weak state governments 
and empowered populaces presents unique challenges. These will come in various shapes, from 
non-state terrorist networks, to unstable and failing regimes, to developing regional powers that 
will attempt to use nationalism, populism, and economic expansion to increase their power. The 
danger for the most developed nation-states, and especially the United States, is the temptation 
of overstretch through strategies unsuited to the age and its limitations.  
How, then, should the United States prepare to face the challenges of the century ahead? The 
waning power of the nation-state impacts the United States especially sharply for two reasons. 
First, because America is now accustomed to being the most powerful nation-state, it is 
especially dependent on its power in the conduct of foreign policy. Second, America’s way of war 
is built around its preeminent nation-state power, making the transition to fighting messier and 
more limited wars in this new era especially difficult.[40] Military historian Russell Weigley wrote, 
“At the beginning, when American military resources were still slight, America made a promising 
beginning in the nurture of strategists of attrition; but the wealth of the country and its adoption of 
unlimited aims in war cut that development short, until the strategy of annihilation became 
characteristically the American way in war.”[41] Strategic leaders in the United States must make 
a conscious effort to recognize this bias, to acknowledge the need for a change in strategy due to 
the current conditions, and to set about preparing the U.S. military and foreign policy apparatus 
for the challenges of attrition.  
The coming battles will not lend themselves to rapid, precision solutions by the overwhelming 
technological and tactical superiority of Western armed forces. Rather than massed battle against 
a like foe, conflicts are more likely to be messy combinations of local, regional, and global 
interests and actors, requiring a nuanced approach specific to each case. Over the coming 
decades, the greatest risk of unrest comes from those states, mostly in the developing world, that 
have yet to define a sustainable political order. Many of these states, both ethnic splinters and 
post-colonial states, are struggling to keep a lid on unrest and political reform through offering 
economic advances, yet the growth and dislocation caused by modernization often exacerbate 
instability.[42] The result is a confluence of sub-state tension and regional economic inter-
penetration that will act like spark and tinder for regional conflict. The main flashpoints for conflict 
of all kinds reside in the developing world, where Western officials are least comfortable and 
knowledgeable.  
In these trouble areas, strategists should not expect adversaries to present themselves for open 
warfare. The futility of facing today’s most advanced militaries in open battle has been amply 
demonstrated, from Vietnam to Iraq. Rather, adversaries will continue to pursue indirect and 
asymmetric warfare. They will attempt to attrite America’s will, its power, and its capacity for 
action. Not only are today’s most advanced nation-states being pushed toward attrition warfare by 
their own conditions, but the enemy, too, has chosen attrition warfare as his preferred mode of 
battle.  
Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of these potential flashpoints in the developing world is that 
they are becoming increasingly penetrated by great power economic interests. American, 
European, Chinese, Russian, and Indian companies (both private and state-owned) are quickly 
penetrating deeper into the new markets of the developing world. The booming growth is 
improving the quality of life for many, but it is also causing the sorts of dislocation that can lead to 
heightened insecurity and unrest. As shaky states and violent sub-state and non-state actors 
begin to create havoc in international markets, great powers can be expected to step forward and 
defend their interests as they always have. This is where intrastate and low-level interstate war in 
the developing world could turn into proxy war between regional and great powers. In a different 
scenario, such a proxy fight could give way to open, but limited conflict between regional powers’ 
forces on neutral soil. Those who posit that interstate war is a thing of the past are most likely in 
for a rude awakening. In all of these cases, however, annihilation of the enemy will be all but 
impossible.  
These conditions require a return to a mode of strategy that has been out of favor for over two 
centuries: attrition. The waning of state power and the rising and independent power of the 
masses both point to this need. Limited in forces, capacity for independent action, and public 
support, nation-state governments will not be able to assemble the vast armies and demand the 
deep sacrifices that annihilatory war entails. Furthermore, even a fully mobilized nation-state 
cannot always force its opponents into annihilatory battle, especially when confronting the non-
state and sub-state forces empowered by the social and technological characteristics of the age. 
If al-Qaeda concentrated on the desert steppes of central Asia, American and NATO forces could 
annihilate them in half a day’s work. The enemy has a vote, however, and most adversaries will 
never accept annihilatory battle with Western forces. Thus, military and political leaders must 
study and accept the old lessons of attrition warfare, and adjust their strategic ways and ends 
accordingly.  
In order to prepare for this coming century of conflict, strategists should begin by plotting a 
conceptual map of the developing world’s likely flashpoints, then overlaying regional and global 
interests. Resource contracts, water rights interests, labor and product markets, weapons deals, 
infrastructure development projects, and the like should all be considered to determine who has a 
stake in these areas and how high their tolerance for loss will be; a low tolerance for loss on a 
given issue increasing the lengths the power will go to protect its interest. Those areas with both 
spark and dry tinder should be pegged for special attention. From this conceptual map, military 
leaders can begin to prepare their strategies and educate their troops to deal with the complex, 
multi-faceted conflicts that are likely to arise. They can shape the battlefield through security 
cooperation and engagement. They can seek the sorts of non-linear, non-annihilatory strategies 
and tactics that will be needed to win in conflicts that combine issues ranging from local tribal 
feuds to global energy supply disputes. They can educate, train, and equip based on sound 
strategic estimates in order to stand ready for the challenge. If they refuse to do these things, if 
they insist on focusing solely on the employment of weapons effects and the return to 
conventional big battle, they risk repeating the tragedies of generals past.  
Homer’s epic poem on the Trojan War is not often looked to for strategic lessons, but even this 
ancient story holds a warning for those who chase decision in battle beyond the limitations of the 
age. In pressing the attack on the Greek army, Hector, leader of the Trojans, succeeded in 
reuniting their forces and angering their greatest warrior. The result was tragedy, both personal 
for Hector and general for the Trojans. He did not heed his limitations and the constraints of 
warfare in his age. In the words of Barry Strauss, “The Trojans followed the wrong strategy. They 
should have let the Greeks tire themselves out…. Impatient, arrogant, and hungry for glory, 
Hector could not accept low-intensity tactics in a defensive strategy; he went after decisive 
battle.”[43] Like Hector, many today are “addicted to a heroic illusion of decisive victory."[44] They 
want their Gaugamela, their Cannae. They want to turn the corner, break the enemy’s back, to 
crush the rebellion in short order, yet these are heroic illusions in the current era. The high noon 
battle cannot be fought when the adversaries do not show up, choosing instead to sucker punch 
you as you leave the ring. The decisive victory cannot be swiftly gained when the roots of conflict 
are layered from local gang wars to regional power struggles. These complex conflicts require a 
longer, non-linear view. This is the reality of warfare in this late nation-state era, and if it is 
overlooked for a heroic illusion, then leaders are setting themselves up for a tragedy of epic 
proportions.  
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